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RESOLUTIONS WITHOUT RESOLVE:
TURNING AWAY FROM U.N. SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS TO ADDRESS
CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE
mma .

acfarlane*

In 2008, the United Nations first recognized rape as a war
crime with the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1820. Since then, the fight against conflict-related sexual violence has become a frequent subject of Security Council Resolutions. But what, if anything, has changed? Wartime sexual violence is still prevalent today and shows no signs of slowing down.
This Note argues that Security Council Resolutions are not an effective method to prevent conflict-related sexual violence. The
procedural weaknesses in passing Security Council Resolutions and the structure of the Security Council itself may do more
harm than good to the efforts to end wartime sexual violence. Instead, this Note finds a solution in an unlikely realm:
using voluntary pollution prevention programs as a template to
address wartime sexual violence. In examining the parallels between the two issues, this Note suggests a new framework for addressing wartime sexual violence, relying on three factors in particular: adequate and consistent funding to key organizations,
regular and credible monitoring of vulnerable communities, and
the credible threat of enforcement.

* J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School (2021). My sincere thanks to the
editors of the Michigan Journal of Gender & Law for their thoughtful suggestions and
insights on this topic.
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Introduction
“The world must draw a red line on the impunity of abusing
women in war.”—Dr. Denis Mukwege, Nobel Peace Prize
1
Laureate 2018.
2

Nadia Murad’s story shocked the public conscience. Ms. Murad is
a Yazidi woman whose hometown is in Sinjar, a district in the moun-

1. “The World Must Draw a Red Line on the Impunity of Abusing Women in War,” Nobel
Peace Prize 2018 Laureate—Dr. Denis Mukwege, NEW AFRICAN (Dec. 10, 2018),
http://newafricanmagazine.com/17552/ [http://perma.cc/P7FB-Z8J8].
2. See Nobel Peace Prize Goes to U.N. Goodwill Ambassador and Congolese Doctor, Highlighting Sexual Violence, U.N. NEWS (Oct. 5, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story
/2018/10/1022322 [http://perma.cc/FKE6-HBCB].

2020]

RESOLUTION WITHOUT RESOLVE

437

3

tains of northern Iraq. In 2014, ISIS soldiers kidnapped Ms. Murad
4
from her home. She was held as a sex slave for three months as she and
several hundred other girls and young women were subjected to repeat5
ed beatings and rapes. Ms. Murad eventually escaped and made her
6
way to a refugee camp near Mosul. She is now an activist for Yazidi
women and a Nobel Peace Prize winner, frequently recognized along
with gynecologist Denis Mukwege for their advocacy on behalf of vic7
tims of sexual violence. Ms. Murad’s work includes rebuilding communities that have suffered through wartime violence; sustainably redeveloping her homeland in Iraq; working with local community groups
to promote projects that focus on healthcare, water, and hygiene; and
8
sponsoring education initiatives for women.
The conflict-related sexual violence that Ms. Murad experienced
has existed since at least the twentieth century, and almost certainly be9
fore this time despite a dearth of documentation. No geographic region
10
has been immune. It frequently occurs during times of conflict as it is
a brutal yet effective way to maintain control over a civilian popula11
tion. Its physical, emotional, and psychological implications are trau3. About Nadia Murad, NADIA’S INITIATIVE, https://nadiasinitiative.org/nadia-murad/
[http://perma.cc/3BA6-J45Q].
4. Nadia Murad—Facts, THE NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace
/2018/murad/facts/ [http://perma.cc/9WU9-D92T].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. About Nadia Murad, supra note 3.
8. Our Work, NADIA’S INITIATIVE, https://www.nadiasinitiative.org/our-work [http://
perma.cc/RS3V-AZH3].
9. See Joanna Bourke, Rape as a Weapon of War, 383 LANCET e19, e19-20 (2014) (book
review).
10. Examples of nations that have experienced the atrocity include France; the Rhineland; Spain; the former Soviet Union; Greece; and, more recently, within Colombia;
Chechnya; India; Bangladesh; the Democratic Republic of Congo; the Central African Republic; and South Sudan. Id; see also Central African Republic: Sexual Violence
as a Weapon of War, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 5, 2017, 12:01 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/05/central-african-republic-sexual-violenceweapon-war [http://perma.cc/XJ78-TUZL]; Rebecca Ratcliffe, Rape is an Instrument
of War in Central African Republic Conflict, Finds Study, GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2017,
8:03 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/oct/05/rapeinstrument-of-war-central-african-republic-conflict-study-sexual-slavery
[http://perma.cc/HGY8-BF7W]; Nick Cumming-Bruce, Mass Rape, a Weapon of
War, Traumatizes South Sudan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/world/africa/un-reports-systematic-rape-insouth-sudan-conflict.html [http://perma.cc/CNC6-JS4P].
11. Anna Gopsill, Recognizing All Victims and Survivors of Sexual Violence in Wartime,
CMI-CHR MICHELSEN INST. (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.cmi.no/news/2096sexual-violence-in-wartime [http://perma.cc/XE3T-FB5K].
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matic and long-lasting, and the shame survivors experience can often12
times prevent subsequent reports of the widespread sexual violence.
The experienced trauma together with the lack of reporting is exactly
what makes wartime sexual violence so effective.
In an effort to globally address wartime sexual violence, the United
Nations (“U.N.”) first recognized rape as a war crime in 2008 with the
13
passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820. Other
resolutions soon followed. They ranged from responses to specific wars
in which sexual violence was committed, like Resolution 2429 (adopted
in 2018) that addressed sexual violence taking place in Sudan and South
14
Sudan, to those with broader purposes, like Resolution 2331 (adopted
in 2016) that addressed the nexus between sexual violence, terrorism,
15
and transnational organized crime. These resolutions have been met
with mixed responses from national governments, international lawyers,
and human rights lobbyists due to their varied purposes and effects.
This Note argues that Security Council Resolutions are an ineffective mechanism to respond to conflict-related sexual violence as they do
more damage than good. Instead, the U.N. should turn to alternative
methods of action that have proved successful in other areas of international law. This Note uses the paradigm of pollution prevention to more
effectively address wartime sexual violence.
Section I provides a brief history of wartime sexual violence and describes the Security Council Resolution enactment process. Section II
describes the procedural difficulties inherent in using Security Council
Resolutions to end wartime sexual violence. It concludes that Security
Council Resolutions are not only an ineffective method to end wartime
sexual violence, but also frequently lead to damaging discourse that ultimately backtrack women’s rights on an international scale. Section III
proposes an alternative to Security Council Resolutions, which more effectively addresses wartime sexual violence. The proposal adopts meth12. Id.
13. Lindsay L. Wright, Fails So Good: An Examination of the United Nations’ Ineffective
Implementation of Resolution 1820 in Democratic Republic of Congo, 35 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 153, 153 (2012). Security Council Resolutions are “formal expressions of the will or opinion” of the United Nations Security Council. Resolutions,
UNITED NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content
/resolutions-0 [http://perma.cc/C2CU-AKQJ]. For a more in-depth discussion on
Security Council Resolutions and their formation, see discussion infra Section I.B.
14. S.C. Res. 2429, ¶ 35 (July 13, 2018).
15. S.C. Res. 2331, ¶ 8 (Dec. 20, 2016); see also Our Mandate, OFF. OF THE SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SEC’Y-GEN. ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT,
https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/our-work/our-mandate/
[http://perma.cc/84E3-B7JH].
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ods used in voluntary pollution prevention programs to eliminate sexual
violence as a weapon of war through U.N. organs. Adequate and consistent funding, regular and credible monitoring, and the threat of enforcement are each explored as tools that may supplant ineffective Security Council Resolutions.
I. Wartime Sexual Violence and the United Nations
Security Council
A. Wartime Sexual Violence
This Section will provide fundamental historical context for sexual
violence during armed conflict and detail the relation between this
atrocity and Security Council Resolutions. First, it is important to understand what this violence is. This Note interchangeably uses “wartime
16
sexual violence,” “conflict-related sexual violence,” and “sexual vio17
lence during armed conflict.” It intentionally avoids the term “rape as
18
19
a weapon of war” due to its narrower connotations. Wartime sexual
violence is not limited to rape; it concerns violence on a much broader
spectrum, including “sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage,” and all oth20
er forms of sexual violence linked to a conflict. The term “conflict,” in
turn, includes situations of “mass armed conflict or ‘lethal intergroup
21
22
violence.’” A formal declaration of war is not necessary. Indeed, even
if only one side is in a position to partake in systematic violence, this
23
may still establish a conflict zone. For example, within the first two

16. See, e.g., Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/conflict-related-sexual-violence [http://perma.cc
/JED7-P2C4] (defining “conflict-related sexual violence”).
17. E.g., Janie Leatherman, Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: Complex Dynamics of ReVictimization, 12 INT’L J. PEACE STUD. 53, 55 (2007) (using the term “sexual violence in armed conflict”).
18. See Maria Eriksson Baaz & Maria Stern, Curious Erasures: The Sexual in Wartime
Sexual Violence, 20 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 295, 296 (2018).
19. See Elizabeth D. Heineman, Introduction to SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT ZONES:
FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE ERA OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 2 (Elizabeth D.
Heineman ed., 2013).
20. U.N. Secretary-General, Conflict Related Sexual Violence, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/2019/280
(Mar. 29, 2019) [hereinafter Conflict Related Sexual Violence].
21. Heineman, supra note 19, at 2.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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weeks of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Hutu majority engaged in
24
rampant sexual violence against the Tutsi minority. While there was
no formal declaration of war, this constituted wartime sexual violence all
25
the same.
Two additional key facts undergird this Note’s discussion of conflict-related sexual violence. First, the perpetrators of sexual violence
during armed conflict are not exclusively male, and those subjected to it
26
are not exclusively female. Although targeting transcends gender, those
27
most commonly subjected to wartime sexual violence are women. Second, wartime sexual violence is inextricably linked to the basic human
28
rights of women. Wartime sexual violence has been equated to acts of
29
30
31
torture, genocide, and terrorism. Its psychological, physical, and social consequences can each prove deadly. Survivors describe a range of
devastating mental health repercussions: Shame, sadness, anger, fear,
anxiety, and depression persist after the violence, and these feelings may

24. Jennifer Rosenberg, A Timeline of the Genocide in Rwanda, THOUGHT CO.
(Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/rwanda-genocide-timeline-1779930
[http://perma.cc/3QAC-QNTA].
25. See id.
26. Dara Kay Cohen, Amelia Hoover Green, & Elisabeth Jean Wood, Wartime Sexual
Violence: Misconceptions, Implications, and Ways Forward, SPECIAL REPORT (U.S. Inst.
of Peace, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2013, at 1, 2. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files
/resources/SR323.pdf [http://perma.cc/5TZ4-A3GR].
27. LaShawn R. Jefferson, In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status, in
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004 325 (Hum. Rts. Watch. ed., 2004),
https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf [https://perma.cc/B64AB9SE]. This takes into account the sexual violence against men and boys that often
goes unreported. See Leatherman, supra note 17, at 54. While data on the levels of
wartime sexual violence against LGBTQIA+ individuals, including transgender, nonbinary, and gender nonconforming individuals, is incomplete, the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention notes that this demographic experiences sexual violence during peacetime at similar or higher rates than straight, cisgender individuals, in addition to higher rates of hate-motivated violence. Sexual Assault and the LGBTQ Community, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/sexual-assault-andthe-lgbt-community [http://perma.cc/4VVD-SQEV]. It seems possible—if not likely—that these statistics would carry into a wartime setting.
28. See Miranda Alison, Wartime Sexual Violence: Women’s Human Rights and Questions
of Masculinity, 33 REV. INT’L STUD. 75, 75 (2007).
29. Pieter Kooijmans, the Former Special Rapporteur on Torture, opined: “Since it was
clear that rape or other forms of sexual assault against women in detention were a
particularly ignominious violation of the inherent dignity and right to physical integrity of the human being, they accordingly constituted an act of torture.” U.N.
ESCOR, 48th Sess., 21st mtg. at ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/SR.21 (Feb. 21,
1992).
30. Conflict Related Sexual Violence, supra note 20, at ¶ 32.
31. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
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32

be further augmented by unwanted pregnancies. Women who survive
33
wartime sexual violence are sometimes left with mutilated genitalia and
34
infected with diseases that can become deadly. These traumas, along
with living through the experience of sexual violence itself, can render
35
survivors pariahs within their own communities. Worse, survivors may
later be subjected to domestic violence or family-led honor killings in
communities that view any sexual activity outside of marriage as shame36
ful or as bringing dishonor. Sexual violence during armed conflict is a
uniquely devastating form of violence that has catastrophic effects on
37
the mental and physical health of survivors.
Sexual violence during times of conflict has been called “as old as
38
warfare.” While this may be true, to assert that sexual violence is always present in wartime or during a conflict is to suggest a “natural”
39
pairing between the two phenomena. This proposition is in itself destructive. Not only does it conceal the diversity of conflict-related vio40
lent experiences, but it also downplays sexual violence as an inevitable
41
consequence of conflict. Commentators have argued that viewing sexual violence as a foregone conclusion during wartime leads to ignoring

32. GLOB. JUST. CTR., THE RIGHT TO AN ABORTION FOR GIRLS AND WOMEN RAPED IN
ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2011), https://globaljusticecenter.net/documents/LegalBrief.
RightToAnAbortion.February2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JJH-UNLF].
33. Id. at 7.
34. Aryn Baker, War and Rape, TIME INT’L, Mar. 21, 2016, at 20, 22-24.
35. GLOB. JUST. CTR., supra note 32, at 5.
36. Id.; see also, e.g., Lama Abu-Odeh, Honor Killings and the Construction of Gender in
Arab Societies, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 911, 918 (2010) (“The physical attachment of the
hymen to the body needs to be evidenced and publicized. Killing a woman because
she fails to bleed on her wedding night is one possible scenario for an honor killing.”).
37. See generally Mahlet Atakilt Woldetsadik, Long-Term Effects of Wartime Sexual Violence on Women and Families (July 2018) (Ph.D. dissertation, Pardee Rand Graduate School) (on file with the Pardee Rand Graduate School Library); see also Véronique Nahoum-Grappe, Sexual Violence in Wartime, 2 INFLEXIONS 183, 187 (2011)
(“The crime of rape is therefore not only a painful invasion of the body, possession
and physical—followed by political—domination, but also a major factor in identity
destruction, in cultures where women’s honour is defined by their rejection of unlawful sexual activity and thus, for example by their virginity up to the time of marriage.”).
38. Heineman, supra note 19, at 5.
39. Nahoum-Grappe, supra note 37, at 184.
40. Id.
41. See Elisabeth Jean Wood & Julia Bleckner, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 3 IISS
ARMED CONFLICT SURV. 25, 25 (2017).
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42

sexual violence as an abuse of human rights. Instead, it is accepted as
43
an “unfortunate but inevitable side effect of sending men to war.”
The true reach of sexual violence during conflict is difficult to
gauge. Historically, few measures have been taken to record sexual vio44
lence against women during armed conflict. Today, flawed methods of
determining the number of victims result in estimates plagued by both
over- and undercounting; as such, when data is produced, the range of
45
estimated victims is wide. For example, estimates of the number of
sexual violence victims during the 1994 Rwandan genocide range from
46
250,000 to 500,000 individuals. Regardless of the lack of conclusive
data, what is clear from these estimates is that sexual violence during
times of conflict is far from behind us. The former United Nations Sec47
retary-General termed this type of violence a “present-day atrocity”
48
and characterized its use as a common tactic of modern warfare.
Responses to wartime sexual violence have varied on both national
and international levels. The focus of this Note centers on international
responses, but frequently, national non-governmental coalitions have
effectively contributed in responding to wartime sexual violence. For example, women-led civil society organizations have mobilized politically
to protest the threat of conflict-related sexual violence in their coun49
50
tries. La Ruta Pacífica de las Mujeres is a grassroots feminist move42. See id. at 32 (arguing that viewing sexual violence in war as not inevitable strengthens
the grounds for holding perpetrators accountable).
43. Dorothy Q. Thomas & Regan E. Ralph, Rape in War: Challenging the Tradition of
Impunity, 14 SAIS REV. 81, 81 (1994).
44. Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations Response, WOMEN2000, April
1998, at 2, 3 (1998).https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/cover.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QZK-BG4B].
45. Tia Palermo & Amber Peterman, Undercounting, Overcounting and the Longevity of
Flawed Estimates: Statistics on Sexual Violence in Conflict, 89 BULL. WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 924, 924-25 (2011).
46. Id.
47. Deputy Secretary-General’s Opening Remarks at Press Briefing with Secretary-General’s
Special Representative Margot Wallstrom and Under-Secretary-General Alain Le Roy,
U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL (Feb. 9, 2010), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/dsg
/press-encounter/2010-02-09/deputy-secretary-generals-opening-remarks-pressbriefing [http://perma.cc/6JWB-4Y74].
48. U.N.: Sexual Violence a ‘Tactic of War,’ HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 14, 2015,
10:13 AM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/un-sexual-violence-tactic-war
[https://perma.cc/65Q2-BPJS].
49. See Anne-Kathrin Kreft, Responding to Sexual Violence: Women’s Mobilization in War,
56 J. PEACE RSCH. 220 (2018).
50. RUTA PACÍFICA DE LAS MUJERES, COLOMBIAN WOMEN’S TRUTH AND MEMORY
COMMISSION 1, https://www.rutapacifica.org.co/descargas/comisionverdad/Truthand
MemoryCommission.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6CU-T6TK].
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ment in Colombia that was instrumental in negotiating a solution to the
country’s 1996 armed conflict between the government and guerrilla
51
groups. The organization, still in existence today, describes itself as
52
“feminist, pacifist, and anti-militarist,” and was formed in a response
53
to the violence women faced in conflict zones. The mandate of La Ruta Pacífica is to showcase the effects that war has on women’s bodies and
54
to demand both accountability and a negotiated solution to conflict.
The effectiveness of these national responses cannot be understated: Any
international solution is necessarily undergirded by the support of national coalitions such as La Ruta Pacífica.
Governments have also worked to prioritize legislation to strengthen protections against wartime sexual violence and to dedicate comprehensive services to survivors. For example, in March 2020, the Sudanese
government signed a Framework of Cooperation with the United Nations to address the sexual violence that has occurred for years within
55
the Darfur region. Among other stipulations, the agreement commits
both the Sudanese government and the United Nations to develop and
support legislation to bolster protections against wartime sexual vio56
lence. The agreement also lays out commitments to provide wideranging health services and support to survivors, and stipulates en57
hanced methods to investigate and prosecute perpetrators. Through
these responses, among other methods, the United Nations has played a
large role in bringing wartime sexual violence to the fore of international
58
conversations on human rights.

51. Id.
52. Andrew Willis Garcés, Ruta Pacifica: Colombian Women Against Violence, UPSIDE
DOWN WORLD (Feb. 4, 2009), http://upsidedownworld.org/archives/colombia/rutapacifica-colombian-women-against-violence/ [https://perma.cc/C86U-6KUT].
53. RUTA PACÍFICA DE LAS MUJERES, supra note 50.
54. Garcés, supra note 52.
55. See, e.g., Press Release, U.N. Off. Special Rep. Sec’y-Gen. on Sexual Violence in
Conflict, The Government of Sudan and the United Nations Sign a Framework of
Cooperation to Prevent and Respond to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (Mar. 11,
2020), https://unamid.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/20200311_press_release_foc
_sudan.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MPK-7MQW].
56. Id.
57. Id.; see also Framework of Cooperation of the Republic of the Sudan and the United
Nations on the Prevention and Response to Sexual Violence in Conflict, 3 (Mar.
10, 2020),
https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/uploads/2020
/03/Signed-Framework-of-Cooperation-with-Sudan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75BS8GCG].
58. See, e.g., Conflict Related Sexual Violence, supra note 20.
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B. United Nations Security Council Resolutions
The U.N. has a number of mechanisms at its disposal to address
the issue of wartime sexual violence and the organization has deployed
these tools with varying levels of success. One such method is the Security Council Resolution.
The United Nations Security Council is one of the six main organs
of the United Nations and is tasked with maintaining international
59
peace and security. To this end, the Security Council has the power to
pass resolutions which serve as “formal expressions of the opinion or will
60
of United Nations organs.” The topics of Security Council Resolutions
61
range from the safety and security of peacekeepers; to commentary on
62
human rights circumstances in a particular country; to topics applica63
ble to a range of geographic areas, like the threat of terrorist acts. In its
capacity as a keeper of peace and security, the United Nations Security
Council has attempted to address wartime sexual violence through resolutions.
64
The Security Council is composed of fifteen members. Five
members are permanent, collectively known as the “Permanent Five”—
China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States—
65
and ten are non-permanent, elected for two-year terms by the United
66
Nations General Assembly. Resolutions are passed by an affirmative
67
vote of nine of the fifteen Security Council members. All members of
68
the “Permanent Five” have veto power under the U.N. Charter. Thus,
59. U.N. Charter art. 39.
60. Resolutions, supra note 13.
61. See S.C. Res. 2518, 1 (Mar. 30, 2020). Peacekeepers are U.N. agents “called upon
not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of
former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.” What is Peacekeeping, UNITED
NATIONS PEACEKEEPING, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping
[https://perma.cc/L5DV-CCEH].
62. See S.C. Res. 2510 (Feb. 12, 2020).
63. See S.C. Res. 2129 (Dec. 17, 2013).
64. U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 1.
65. Id.
66. U.N. Charter art. 23, ¶ 2. The ten non-permanent members are currently: Belgium,
Dominican Republic, Estonia, Germany, Indonesia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, South Africa, Tunisia, and Vietnam. Current Members, UNITED
NATIONS SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/currentmembers [https://perma.cc/WJX9-BHFQ].
67. U.N. Charter art. 27, ¶ 2.
68. See id. ¶ 3.
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if any member of the Permanent Five votes against a resolution, the res69
olution will fail.
The Security Council derives its authority to adopt resolutions
from the U.N. Charter. It may enact a resolution under one of two
chapters of the Charter. Different international legal consequences flow
from resolutions adopted under the respective Chapters. Chapter VII of
the Charter allows the Security Council to deploy forces by land, sea, or
70
air to enforce peace and security. Further, it permits U.N. Member
States to take more aggressive measures to address resistance against
peacekeeping operations when more protection-oriented measures have
71
failed. These initial protection-oriented measures typically take place
under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter which governs the pacific settle72
ments of disputes. Resolutions adopted under Chapter VII are generally considered to be legally enforceable, while those adopted under Chap73
ter VI are understood to be non-binding.
This is not to say that non-binding U.N. resolutions passed under
Chapter VI can never contribute meaningfully to international peace
and security. But in terms of conflict-related sexual violence, the efficacy
74
of these resolutions is a matter of debate. Ten years after the enactment
of the first Security Council Resolution addressing wartime sexual vio75
76
lence, this weapon of war is still often used with impunity. That sex-

69. Note that only a veto (or vote against a resolution) forces any resolution to fail entirely. Members of the Permanent Five may abstain from voting with no effect on the
outcome of the resolution, providing that the resolution receives the requisite support
from other members of the U.N. Security Council. SEC. COUNCIL REP., THE VETO
(2015), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org (search “The Veto”) [https://perma.cc
/X295-RYKE]. For more information on the process of abstaining from Security
Council votes, see Leo Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstentions from Voting
and Absence from Meeting, 60 YALE L.J. 209 (1951).
70. U.N. Charter arts. 42, 45, 50.
71. See SEC. COUNCIL REP., SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION UNDER CHAPTER VII: MYTHS
AND REALITIES (2008), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org (search “Security
Council Action Under Chapter VII”) [https://perma.cc/6V3C-BGER].
72. See U.N. Charter arts. 33-38.
73. See id. at 7, 9; see also S.C. Res. 2467 (Apr. 23, 2019); Sexual Violence Monitoring,
PEACEWOMEN, http://www.peacewomen.org/security-council/sexual-violenceindicators-and-monitoring [https://perma.cc/8ZGB-ZA2Z].
74. See SEC. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 71, at 9. See also Sophie Huvé, The Use of
U.N. Sanctions to Address Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, GEORGETOWN INST.
FOR WOMEN, PEACE & SEC. 23-26 (2018), https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/03/Use-of-UN-Sanctions-to-Address-Conflict-related-SexualViolence.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVB5-2XEX].
75. See S.C. Res. 1820 (June 19, 2008).
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ual violence during wartime continues unabated and is even increasing
77
in an alarming number of regions throughout the world is but one indicator that existing Security Council Resolutions have been and will
continue to be an ineffective tool to address this issue.
II. The Deficiencies of Security Council Resolutions in
Addressing Wartime Sexual Violence
Problems with addressing conflict-related sexual violence through
Security Council Resolutions chiefly stem from the procedural aspects
of passing those resolutions. Section II.A details how the consensusbuilding process necessary to pass a resolution can cause a regression in
Security Council precedent, which in turn causes a backsliding of women’s rights. Section II.B outlines how the Security Council voting structure creates undesirable incentives for powerful members to veto resolutions that might be used to address human rights abuses within their
own borders. Section II.C identifies how the Security Council’s limitations necessarily position the protection of women from sexual violence
as a means to an end. This creates a hierarchy that subverts women’s
rights, making them secondary to international peace and security. Finally, Section II.D showcases how, in spite of over a decade’s worth of
Security Council Resolutions addressing the subject, there is a dearth of
normative and behavioral change surrounding sexual violence during
conflict.
A. The Drawbacks of Consensus-Building
On April 29, 2019, the United Nations Security Council passed
78
Resolution 2467 on Women, Peace and Security. It was lauded by the

76. See Sexual Violence as a Weapon of War, DR. DENIS MUKWEGE FOUND.,
https://www.mukwegefoundation.org/the-problem/rape-as-a-weapon-of-war/
[https://perma.cc/HYC3-S9N3].
77. See id. Known areas of sexual violence currently include Syria, Iraq, South Sudan and
Burma. Christian Caryl, Opinion, Rape Is Still Being Used as a Weapon of War Right
Now. Today., WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/democracy-post/wp/2017/11/21/rape-is-still-being-used-as-a-weapon-of-war-rightnow-today/ [https://perma.cc/E3GL-3TBG].
78. Press Release, U.N. Off. Special Rep. Sec’y-Gen. on Sexual Violence in Conflict,
Landmark U.N. Security Council Resolution 2467 (2019) Strengthens Justice and
Accountability and Calls for a Survivor-Centered Approach in the Prevention and
Response to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.un.org
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United Nations as strengthening justice and accountability and for its
“survivor-centered approach in the prevention and response to conflict79
related sexual violence.” At first blush, the text of the Resolution is encouraging. The Resolution calls upon United Nations Member States to
provide care to survivors of rape during situations of armed conflict
without “any discrimination,” and draws attention to “groups that are
particularly vulnerable or may be specifically targeted” in conflict and
80
post-conflict situations. The Resolution also requests that the Secretary-General report periodically on Member State compliance and steps
81
taken to implement the Resolution. Finally, Article 35 of the Resolution encourages countries to adopt and regularly refresh fully funded national action plans to progress the U.N.’s Women, Peace and Security
82
Agenda. This initiative stresses the importance of women’s equal participation in post-conflict reconstruction and in the promotion of peace
83
and security. It also encourages the incorporation of all gender per84
spectives in U.N. efforts to promote and maintain peace and security.
Finally, Resolution 2467 includes a number of firsts. These include welcoming regular briefings by women from civil society groups on conflict-related sexual violence and addressing the unique hardships of
85
mothers of children born from rape.

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

84.
85.

/sexualviolenceinconflict/press-release/landmark-un-security-council-resolution2467-2019-strengthens-justice-and-accountability-and-calls-for-a-survivor-centeredapproach-in-the-prevention-and-response-to-conflict-related-sexual-violence [https://
perma.cc/RZQ2-S5W3] [hereinafter Landmark U.N. Security Council Resolution
2467]; Overview of Resolution 2467: Women, Peace and Security, PERMANENT
MISSION OF THE FED. REPUBLIC OF GER. TO UNITED NATIONS, https://new-yorkun.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/-/2216570 [https://perma.cc/L5QR-UE6V].
Landmark U.N. Security Council Resolution 2467, supra note 78.
S.C. Res. 2467, ¶ 16 (Apr. 23, 2019); see also Landmark U.N. Security Council Resolution 2467, supra note 78.
See S.C. Res. 2467, ¶¶ 6, 8 (Apr. 2019).
Id. ¶ 35.
Landmark Resolution on Women, Peace and Security, OFF. OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER
ON GENDER ISSUES & THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, https://www.un.org
/womenwatch/osagi/wps/ [https://perma.cc/FP79-DCQL].
Id.
A Security Council report explains:
For the first time, the Security Council addresses the situation of mothers
of children born of sexual violence and their children in detail and spells
out the challenges facing them, such as economic and social marginalization, physical and psychological injury, statelessness, discrimination and
lack of access to reparations. The resolution requests the SecretaryGeneral to provide a report to the Security Council on this topic until
2021.
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These developments should not obscure the reality that the consensus-building process diluted the Resolution and resulted in a watered86
down decree that varied widely from its original form. Certain aspects
of Resolution 2467 are a regression. Notably absent from Resolution
2467 is any mention of sexual and reproductive health services for sur87
vivors of sexual violence during armed conflict. This is significant because it is a marked backslide from previous Security Council Resolutions which have recognized the sexual and reproductive rights of
88
women for over twenty years. Further, the word “gender” is conspicu89
ously absent from the text of the resolution. This is meaningful because it signals that transgender individuals are excluded from the scope
90
of the resolution. Moreover, it departs from past practice where the
term was used liberally in resolutions addressing conflict-related sexual
91
violence.

Landmark U.N. Security Council Resolution 2467, supra note 78.
86. For example, a series of insights produced by the Security Council Report on evolving Security Council actions explains:
Three permanent members of the Council (China, Russia, and the US)
expressed opposition to several aspects of the text during the negotiations,
and at various stages of the process, all three threatened to use their veto.
The original draft resolution was ambitious. Designed to focus on a “survivor-centered approach” to preventing and responding to sexual violence
in conflict, it addressed several issues that were controversial for these
permanent members. Among the contentious issues were whether to include language on the sexual and reproductive health of victims of sexual
violence, whether to establish a formal mechanism (that is, a working
group) on sexual violence in conflict, references to the International
Criminal Court (ICC), and recognition of LGBTI as a vulnerable group.

87.
88.

89.
90.

91.

See In Hindsight: Negotiations on Resolution 2467 on Sexual Violence Conflict, WHAT’S
IN BLUE: INSIGHTS ON THE WORK OF THE U.N. SEC. COUNCIL (May 2, 2019),
https://www.whatsinblue.org/2019/05/in-hindsight-negotiations-on-resolution2467-on-sexual-violence-in-conflict.php [https://perma.cc/ZBM5-Q8AU].
Id.
U.S. Stance at U.N. a Backward Step on Women’s Rights, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Apr. 25, 2019, 11:30 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/04/25/us-stance-unbackward-step-womens-rights [https://perma.cc/29DP-7WNM].
In Hindsight: Negotiations on Resolution 2467 on Sexual Violence Conflict, supra note
86.
See Julian Borger, Trump Administration Wants to Remove ‘Gender’ From U.N. Human Rights Documents, GUARDIAN (Oct. 25, 2018, 1:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/24/trump-administration-gendertransgender-united-nations [https://perma.cc/D4RW-JU4B].
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1820 art. 11 (June 19, 2008); S.C. Res. 2331 Preamble, ¶¶ 8, 19
(Dec. 20, 2016); S.C. Res. 2429 Preamble, ¶¶ 7, 11, 19, 27, 35, 39, 44, 56 (July 13,
2018).
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Finally, because the Security Council implicitly adopted the Reso92
lution under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, compliance with the
Security Council’s recommendations is not mandated and no enforce93
ment actions can be taken. Although this does not mean U.N. members may flout the resolution with impunity, holding states accountable
is a difficult endeavor. Member states are well aware of this: Although
the Council passed the Resolution with strong support—thirteen votes
in favor and two abstentions from permanent members China and Russia—U.N. Member States such as China still flouted attempts to estab94
lish a formal mechanism implementing the Resolution, thereby frus95
trating its effectiveness.
The negotiations leading to Resolution 2467 and its final outcome
give insight into why Security Council Resolutions are manifestly deficient in addressing and preventing conflict-related sexual violence.
Three key issues remained on the table throughout much of the negotiations involving Resolution 2467: the use of the term “gender” within
the text of the Resolution, the desired implementation mechanism for
the Resolution, and the inclusion of a reference to sexual reproductive

92. See infra Section II.B.
93. However, as has been made known by the International Court of Justice, under Article 25 members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. See U.N. Charter art.
25; CHRISTINE CHINKIN & MADELEINE REES, COMMENTARY ON SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION: CONTINUED STATE OBLIGATION AND CIVIL SOCIETY
ACTION ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT 2467 4 (2019), http://www.lse.ac.uk
/women-peace-security/assets/documents/2019/Final-WPS-Commentary-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7JLW-9XWH]. Although U.N. Members have agreed to accept
and abide by Security Council Resolutions, in practice, there is little way to enforce
this under Chapter VI.
94. Note that working groups are a common mechanism used in Resolutions and widely
thought to represent customary international law, thereby strengthening their implementation. See, e.g., Working Group on Discrimination Against Women and Girls,
U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues
/Women/WGWomen/Pages/WGWomenIndex.aspx [https://perma.cc/C8KZRRJG]; Open-Ended Working Group on an Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child to Provide a Communications Procedure, UNITED NATIONS HUM.
RTS. COUNCIL (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGCRC/Pages
/OpenEndedWorkingGroupIndex.aspx [https://perma.cc/ME9R-D64Q]. Instead,
Resolution 2467 calls upon “other relevant United Nations missions and United Nations entities,” such as the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict and the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, to
share information with the U.N. Security Council Sanctions Committees and
“strengthen their cooperation” regarding this exchange of information. S.C. Res.
2467, supra note 73, ¶ 12.
95. In Hindsight: Negotiations on Res. 2467 on Sexual Violence Conflict, supra note 86.
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96

rights and services. Actions by the United States, China, and Russia
led to the elimination of text addressing each of these issues. As explained below, the discussions between permanent members and their
veto powers are emblematic of the larger problem of using Security
Council Resolutions to address and prevent sexual violence as a weapon
of war.
First, the United States threatened to veto the resolution if it included any mention of sexual and reproductive health services for survi97
vors of conflict-related sexual violence. The Trump administration objected to this language for fear of it being construed as in support of
98
abortion. That members of the Security Council bowed to the United
States’ objection is stunning when one considers the international
community’s stated views on a woman’s right to abortion following
rape: The Human Rights Committee’s position is that “countries must
provide safe, legal and effective access to abortion . . . most notably
99
where the pregnancy is the result of rape”; the Committee Against
Torture notes that forced pregnancy in the context of sexual violence
100
constitutes torture; and both the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) and the Commission on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities state that legal abortion is a “prerequisite for safeguarding . . . human rights to life, health, equality before
the law and equal protection of the law, non-discrimination, infor96. Id.
97. Id.; see also Nina Besser Doorley, Trump Administration Escalates War on Words at the
U.N., INT’L WOMEN’S HEALTH COAL. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://iwhc.org/2019/04
/trump-administration-escalates-war-words-un/ [https://perma.cc/25KR-QH3N].
98. Doorley, supra note 97. Note also that some scholars have argued that this policy
should be considered in tandem with Trump’s revival of the “Global Gag Rule,” a
policy introduced under the Reagan administration, which bans non-U.S. nongovernmental organizations from receiving U.S. funds if they give information and
referrals for abortion, provide safe abortion, or call for improved abortion legislation.
Zoe Gillard, In Pursuing a New Resolution on Sexual Violence Security Council Significantly Undermines Women’s Reproductive Rights, LONDON SCH. OF ECON.: WOMEN,
PEACE, & SEC. F. (April 25, 2019), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2019/04/25/inpursuing-a-new-resolution-on-sexual-violence-security-council-significantlyundermines-womens-reproductive-rights/ [https://perma.cc/WZ9Y-XWEV]; What is
the Global Gag Rule?, SHE DECIDES, https://www.shedecides.com/what-is-the-globalgag-rule/ [https://perma.cc/AS82-V7HS].
99. Stop Regression on Sexual and Reproductive Rights of Women and Girls, UN Experts
Urge, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents
/Reproductive_Rights_Violations_As_Torture.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM3S-48DA].
100. See Reproductive Rights Violations as Torture or Ill-Treatment, CTR. FOR REPROD.
RIGHTS, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WG/AmicusBrazil.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MH4G-QF5C]
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mation, privacy, bodily integrity and freedom from torture and ill
101
treatment.”
Despite the consensus in the international community that abortion is a vital human right, the United States’ opposition was effective.
The language in support of sexual and reproductive services for survivors
102
was eliminated. This illustrates one of the key weaknesses in using Security Council Resolutions to address human rights issues in general,
and conflict-related sexual violence in particular: Thanks to the permanent members’ veto power, even one regressive state administration can
erase years of global progress on the development of human rights
norms through their insistence on the inclusion or omission of choice
terms within a resolution’s text.
Two other countries’ objections following the resolution’s passage
also exemplify this devastating power dynamic. After Resolution 2467
passed, China and Russia objected to the creation of a working group
on sexual violence in conflict (in essence, an accountability mechanism)
by way of feeble explanations denouncing an overload of bureaucracy
103
and shortage of “extensive discussions.” This pretext was to be expected: Both countries frequently vote against or abstain from Security
104
Council Resolutions affirming human rights.
Finally, the Security Council eliminated the word “gender” due to
an enduring campaign by the Trump administration to remove the term

101. Ref: Denial of Abortion Services and the Prohibition of Torture and Cruel, Inhuman and
Degrading Treatment, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Sept. 5,
2018), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=
23503&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/2MAU-WGQR].
102. Doorley, supra note 97.
103. A U.N. General Assembly report explains:
China and Russia in particular made clear their reluctance to see a working group at present, with China saying that “it is important to have extensive discussions well in advance” before creating “special mechanisms,” and Russia declaring that it was concerned “about the efforts to
increase the number of bureaucratic United Nations bodies in order to
create the appearance of robust activity.
In Hindsight: Negotiations on Resolution 2467 on Sexual Violence Conflict, supra note
86.
104. See, e.g., Sophie Richardson, Is China Winning Its Fight Against Rights at the U.N.?,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 12, 2018, 9:41 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12
/12/china-winning-its-fight-against-rights-un
[https://perma.cc/F8UP-HX37];
Sherine Tadros, New Low for the U.N. Security Council as Russia Takes Syrian Human
Rights off the Table, AMNESTY INT’L (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en
/latest/news/2018/03/a-new-low-for-the-un-security-council-as-russia-takes-syrianhuman-rights-off-the-table/ [https://perma.cc/GAK2-E2XS].
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105

from all U.N. human rights documents. Commentators have described this as an “ongoing strategy to undermine the recognized human
106
rights of transgender individuals.” This is consistent with past actions
by the Trump administration to ensure that transgender persons are not
accorded the same protections as cisgender women and girls. For example, in a previous U.N. draft document promoting gender equality, the
U.S. administration under Trump recommended that the section be
107
clarified to refer to only women and girls. The transphobic actions of
the Trump administration demonstrate the power dynamics of the
Permanent Five in action. Put simply, it only takes one backwards administration to implement unacceptable changes within the text of a Security Council Resolution.
Despite Resolution 2467’s deficiencies, Member States such as
108
France saw it as a step in the right direction. This is unsurprising
when one considers the deference accorded to Security Council Resolutions on the international stage. There is a dominant narrative propped
109
up by the media and some members of the international communi110
ty that Security Council Resolutions are both effective and powerful.
Throwing the weight of at least three of the permanent members behind
the text of any Security Council Resolution related to conflict-related
sexual violence serves not only to highlight the issue to an international
audience, but can even elicit united action from U.N. Member States
and U.N. committees to support the Resolution’s mandate.
When evaluated on the strength of their signaling function, however, the power of Security Council Resolutions may also be their greatest
weakness. Security Council Resolutions either seek to “confirm [the
Council’s] support for the validity and enforcement of the relevant in-

105. Borger, supra note 90.
106. Id.
107. Colum Lynch & Robbie Gramer, At the U.N., America Turns Back the Clock on
Women’s Rights, FOREIGN POL’Y (Mar. 14, 2019), https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03
/14/at-united-nations-women-rights-gender-health-trump-diplomacy/
[https://perma.cc/2F2A-GAA6].
108. Resolution 2467: The Text Is Not the End of Our Journey, PERMANENT MISSION OF
FRANCE TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN N.Y. (Apr. 23, 2019), https://onu.deleg
france.org/Resolution-2467-the-text-is-not-the-end-of-our-journey [https://perma.cc
/37MH-GWR7].
109. See, e.g., Matthew Hauenstein & Madhav Joshi, U.N. Resolutions Might Seem Like
Cheap Talk. But They Might Actually Work., WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/22/un-resolutions-may-seemlike-cheap-talk-they-might-actually-work/ [https://perma.cc/36VR-HJKB].
110. See, e.g., ALEXANDER THOMPSON, CHANNELS OF POWER: THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL AND U.S. STATECRAFT IN IRAQ 204-10 (2010).
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ternational norms and instruments,” or “impact, qualify or modify the
111
existing legal position under international law.” That is to say, omissions speak just as powerfully as affirmative statements. With the Security Council’s deliberate elimination of text supporting access to reproductive health services, Resolution 2467 backslid Security Council precprecedent by at least ten years. Earlier resolutions in 2009 and 2013
both recognized the need for and promoted access to reproductive
112
health services for victims of sexual violence during wartime. The
United States’ well-publicized rejection of terms supporting access to
these services modifies the U.N.’s previous position that these services
113
are vital, taking a step back rather than confirming their value. Germany, the drafter of Resolution 2467, was forced to accede to U.S. de114
mands or risk foregoing the resolution entirely. And herein lies the
difficulty: Is the greater risk to deny the passage of any Security Council
Resolution, or to pass one that implicitly regresses the Security Council’s stance on women’s rights?
B. Undesirable Incentives
The voting structure of the Permanent Five is the second reason
that Security Council Resolutions cannot sufficiently address wartime
sexual violence. Even if the omissions discussed above insisted upon by
the United States are not viewed as significant, the divided votes from
the Security Council’s permanent members should be. When 40% of
the permanent members decline to support a resolution condemning
sexual violence in conflict, claims of the Resolution’s “landmark” status
and its characterization as a “powerful new instrument” in the United
Nations’ arsenal for addressing wartime sexual violence become far less
115
convincing.

111. Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Acts of the Security Council: Standards of Review, 11
MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 143, 145 (2007).
112. See KERRY F. CRAWFORD, WARTIME SEXUAL VIOLENCE: FROM SILENCE TO
CONDEMNATION OF A WEAPON OF WAR 113-114 (2017).
113. S.C. Res. 1889 ¶ 10 (Oct. 5, 2009); S.C. Res. 2106 ¶ 19 (June 24, 2013); see also
Resolution 2467: The Text Is Not the End of Our Journey, supra note 108.
114. Vanessa Jackson, What Does April’s Security Council Resolution on Sexual Violence in
Conflict Mean for Women and Girls?, GLOB. OBSERVATORY (Oct. 16, 2019),
https://theglobalobservatory.org/2019/10/what-does-april-security-councilresolution-sexual-violence-conflict-mean-for-women-girls/ [https://perma.cc/4BTH4LUN].
115. See Landmark U.N. Sec. Council Res. 2467, supra note 78.
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Security Council Resolutions can also be a dangerous tool when
used to negotiate texts on human rights, and particularly the rights of
women. China and Russia, two of the five permanent members of the
Security Council, have left unaddressed grave abuses of women within
116
their respective states and are thereby incentivized to withhold support for resolutions pertaining to human rights. Similarly, these states
are more likely to push back against effective mechanisms such as working groups, which could conceivably be used to support human rights
117
within their own nations’ borders.
C. The Protection of Women as a Means to an End
The third problem with using Security Council Resolutions as a
mechanism to respond to sexual violence as a weapon of war stems from
the mandate of the Security Council itself. The very framework of the
Security Council prevents its members from addressing wartime sexual
violence in a way that fully recognizes women’s rights as human rights.
The Security Council’s mandate only allows the Council to create binding resolutions—those created under Chapter VII of the U.N. Char118
ter—in order to protect international peace and security. This means
that resolutions must position the prevention of sexual violence against
119
women as a means to that end, rather than a goal in and of itself : Pro116. See China: Events of 2018, HUM. RTS. WATCH (2018), https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2019/country-chapters/china-and-tibet
[https://perma.cc/3WME-356G];
Yulia Gorbunoa, The Chilling Inaction on Domestic Violence in Russia is Endangering
Women’s Lives, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 29, 2019, 11:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org
/news/2019/07/29/chilling-inaction-domestic-violence-russia-endangering-womenslives [https://perma.cc/CUP4-T9QC].
117. See Alexandra Ma, China is Reportedly Sending Men to Sleep in the Same Beds as Uighur Muslim Women While Their Husbands Are in Prison Camps, BUS. INSIDER (Nov.
4, 2019, 7:06 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/china-uighur-monitor-homeshared-bed-report-2019-11 [https://perma.cc/NBC5-EP3E]; Elizabeth M. Lynch,
China’s Attacks on Uighur Women Are Crimes Against Humanity, WASH. POST (Oct.
21, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/21/chinas-attacksuighur-women-are-crimes-against-humanity/ [https://perma.cc/E3R6-GX5A ]; Yuliana Gorbunova, “I Could Kill You and No One Would Stop Me”: Weak State Response
to Domestic Violence in Russia, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/25/i-could-kill-you-and-no-one-would-stopme/weak-state-response-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/7BQT-YZZ9]; Russia:
Unaddressed Domestic Violence Puts Women at Risk, HUM. RTS WATCH (Oct. 25
2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/25/russia-unaddresseddomestic-violence-puts-women-risk [https://perma.cc/JZ3A-BD2Q].
118. U.N. Charter, art. 23.
119. For example, Resolution 1820 explains:
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tecting women is within the purview of the Security Council only inso120
far as women are a peacebuilding resource. Sexual violence during
wartime must be prevented because it “negatively affects women’s role
121
as agents of peace.” It is the structure of the U.N. Charter itself that
promotes this harmful discourse. To create an effective, binding, and
enforceable resolution addressing the prevention of wartime sexual violence, the issue must be framed as a mere stop on the road toward the
end result of peace and stability within nations.
Of course, the skeptic will be quick to note that the Security
Council is not solely limited to the binding resolutions of Chapter VII,
and can therefore take certain actions without needing to meet Chapter
VII’s restrictive demands. Resolutions brought forth under Chapter VI
of the U.N. Charter are non-binding, but unlike Chapter VII, the mandate to act only for purposes of “international peace and security” does
122
not exist.
While this may make Chapter VI resolutions easier to pass, two key
issues remain with these resolutions. First, they are only binding on
123
states that consent to their application. If the country upon which the
U.N. wishes to impose the resolution is itself a perpetrator of wartime
124
sexual violence, enforcement becomes exceedingly difficult, as it is unlikely that even a non-binding resolution will earn the support of the offending country. Second, the legality of non-binding Security Council

The Security Council . . . [is d]eeply concerned also about the persistent
obstacles and challenges to women’s participation and full involvement in
the prevention and resolution of conflicts as a result of violence, intimidation and discrimination, which erode women’s capacity and legitimacy
to participate in post-conflict public life, and acknowledging the negative
impact this has on durable peace, security and reconciliation, including
post-conflict peacebuilding.
S.C. Res. 1820, ¶ 11.
120. Id.
121. Maria Jansson & Maud Edwards, The Politics of Gender in the U.N. Security Council
Resolutions on Women, Peace & Security, 18 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL’Y 591, 598 (2016).
122. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Orgs., Hum. Rts., & Oversight of the H.
Comm. on Foreign Affs., 110th Cong. 29 (2008) (prepared statement of Michael J.
Matheson, Visiting Research Professor of Law, The George Washington University
Law School).
123. ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 49 (1998).
124. For example, wartime rape by government forces occurred during the conflict in Darfur to which the Security Council responded with Resolution 1769. S.C. Res. 1769
(July 31, 2007); HUM. RTS. WATCH, FIVE YEARS ON: NO JUSTICE FOR SEXUAL
VIOLENCE IN DARFUR 10-24 (2008), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/darfur0408
/darfur0408webwcover.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9XA-97HZ].

456

michigan journal of gender

& law

[Vol. 27:435
125

Resolutions is frequently challenged on jurisdictional grounds. And
even those resolutions stipulating efforts to end sexual violence against
126
women that do go unchallenged have historically been ineffective. In
sum, the need for consensus, nations’ undesirable and conflicting incentives, and viewing the protection of women as a means to an end are
near-insurmountable obstacles that render Security Council Resolutions
an ineffective transnational mechanism to prevent wartime sexual violence.
D. Dearth of Lasting Normative and Behavioral Change
In the decade since Security Council Resolutions have begun to
address the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence, behavioral
norms surrounding the use of this type of violence in war have not undergone any significant changes. Resolution 1888 (2009) was the first to
call for any obligation or implementation mechanism to prevent sexual
127
violence as a weapon of war. Since then, Resolution 1960 (2010)
went further by calling for annual reports identifying perpetrators credibly suspected of committing sexual violence to hold them accounta128
ble. Three years later, Resolution 2106 (2013) acknowledged that
men and transgender individuals could be targets and victims of conflict-related sexual violence, overturning the assumption that only wom129
en are affected by these atrocities. In spite of this progression in Secu125. As Malihe Behtar and Hassan Savari explain:
The text and spirit of the charter does not recognize the Security Council
as an authority with infinite jurisdiction. Granting permission to the Security Council of States to make binding decisions doesn’t mean that the
Security Council can go beyond its jurisdiction directly or indirectly. In
this regard legality of Security Council resolutions . . . have been challenged. These resolutions [are] contested by one or some States. These
challenges [raise] judicial review of the Security Council decisions.

126.

127.
128.
129.

Malihe Behfar & Hassan Savari, Evaluation of UN Security Council Resolutions by
States, 10 J. POL’Y & L. 204 (2017).
Wright, supra note 13, at 101 (“The United Nations deferred formal recognition of
rape as a war crime until 2008, when it passed S.C. Res. 1820 (Resolution 1820). Efforts to end sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) failed
despite a detailed U.N. strategy to end atrocities.”); CRAWFORD, supra note 112
(“Resolution 1960 recognizes the all-too-frequent gap between Security Council resolutions and actual commitments by the U.N. and its Member States, and it demonstrates frustration with combatants’ continued use and tolerance of sexual violence.”).
CRAWFORD, supra note 112 at 113.
Id.
Id.
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rity Council discourse, wartime sexual violence is still considered acceptable in many parts of the world, and perpetrators are neither con130
sistently nor effectively held accountable.
III. A New Solution to Address Wartime Sexual Violence
Since U.N. Security Resolutions have failed and will continue to
fail to effectively stem wartime sexual misconduct, U.N. Member States
must turn to alternative mechanisms for addressing and preventing sexual violence during armed conflict. Inspiration may be found in an unlikely setting. The international practices used to create voluntary pollution prevention programs provide an unorthodox yet effective template
131
to address wartime sexual violence. These international practices reveal parallels between the two issues and provide a new framework for
addressing wartime sexual violence—one that does not rely on ineffective Security Council Resolutions.
Section III.A details the common themes of the global fight against
pollution and the prevention of wartime sexual violence. This analysis
underscores why U.N. Member States should turn to the Voluntary
Pollution Prevention Framework to address sexual violence as a weapon
of war. Section III.B discusses the application of the Voluntary Pollution Prevention Framework to wartime sexual violence and identifies
three crucial factors to the success of international cooperation in this
realm: Adequate and consistent funding, regular and credible monitoring, and the threat of enforcement.
A. Common Themes Between the Fight Against Pollution and the
Prevention of Wartime Sexual Violence
The fight against the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war
shares three key similarities with the global fight against pollution. First,
in each case, there is a dearth of international action despite consensus
that a problem exists. Second, when initiatives are undertaken, followthrough and execution are exceedingly rare. Finally, solving both issues

130. Id.
131. See generally Donald G. Chittock & Kenneth F.D. Hughey, A Review of International
Practice in the Design of Voluntary Pollution Prevention Programs, 19 J. CLEANER
PROD. 542 (2010) (examining the features of successful voluntary pollution prevention programs undertaken by Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States).
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requires cooperation on a global level. Examining the solutions to these
problems in the pollution context may prove useful in tackling the prevention of sexual violence during conflict.
i. Consensus
The primary similarity stems from the fact that despite widespread
consensus among industry experts on the environmental and economic
132
effects of pollution, international consensus on plans for action remains lacking. Within the past four years alone, the United States with133
drew from the landmark Paris Climate Accord; Brazil’s president
committed to the destruction of the Amazon by way of defending de134
forestation as “cultural”; and China refused to make any promises to
take stronger climate action at the 2019 U.N. Climate Action Summit,
despite excoriation from an official at the World Resources Institute and
135
from other climate change advocates and diplomats.

132. See Dana Nuccitelli, 95% Consensus of Expert Economists: Cut Carbon Pollution,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 4, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment
/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2016/jan/04/consensus-of-economists-cut-carbonpollution [http://perma.cc/DU2U-LWKP]; AM. LUNG ASS’N, STATE OF THE AIR
2019 4 (2019), https://www.lung.org/assets/documents/healthy-air/state-of-the-air
/sota-2019-full.pdf [http://perma.cc/A6W3-WZQJ].
133. See Press Statement, Michael R. Pompeo, Sec’y of State, On the U.S. Withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement, (Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.state.gov/on-the-u-swithdrawal-from-the-paris-agreement/ [http://perma.cc/Y8TZ-A2DH]. Critics of the
United States’ withdrawal note that this may have a devastating effect on the agreement as a whole. Concerns abound that other nations will follow in the United
States’ steps to leave; that this is not within the world’s best interests, as we are on the
brink of a global climate catastrophe; and that the Paris Agreement was the “most realistic approach for all of the nations of the world to positively address climate
change.” Fran Ulmer & Carlos Curbelo, Commentary: U.S. Should Not Withdraw
from Paris Climate Accord, CORDOVA TIMES (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.the
cordovatimes.com/2019/12/16/commentary-u-s-should-not-withdraw-from-parisclimate-accord/ [http://perma.cc/VYW9-B8L4].
134. Marina Lopes, Brazil’s Bolsonaro Calls Amazon Deforestation ‘Cultural,’ Says ‘It Will
Never End’, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/the_americas/brazils-bolsonaro-calls-amazon-deforestation-cultural-says-it-willnever-end/2019/11/20/ba536498-0ba3-11ea-8054-289aef6e38a3_story.html
[http://perma.cc/P28H-ADM4].
135. Among other issues, environmental advocates wanted China to make commitments
to move away from fossil fuels; to show initiative and a commitment to taking climate change seriously; and to meet global expectations for environmental leadership
that belie its position as a major world economy. See Somini Sengupta & Lisa Friedman, At U.N. Climate Summit, Few Commitments and U.S. Silence, N.Y. TIMES
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Consider a simplified explanation of incentives that drive environmental policies. The United States’ stated reason for withdrawing from
the Paris Agreement was because it was “unfair” to the United States
136
compared to the Agreement’s treatment of China and India. The
United States further protested that complying with the Agreement de137
parted from the administration’s “America First” policy. Brazil’s reluctance to act on environmental conservation efforts stemmed from President Jair Bolsonaro’s position that environmental regulations must be
138
relaxed to encourage economic growth. China refused to take a
stronger stance on climate change based on resource concerns: A past
green initiative created a heightened demand for certain fuels, which at
the time produced a shortage of the resource and left millions without
139
heat.
As with the prevention of sexual violence as a weapon of war, competing motivations in the realm of voluntary pollution prevention have
created a tradition in which powerful nations fall short of commitments
140
to robust transnational action plans. Under President Trump, the
United States refused to advocate for services that might be interpreted
as endorsing abortion within Security Council Resolution 2467 for fear
of betraying the Republican Party’s position of opposing the procedure
141
at all costs. China is also unwilling to sign onto resolutions that endorse human rights for fear of the implications that endorsing such reso142
lutions might have on China itself. These competing motivations prevent full, effective commitments from both countries to address wartime
sexual violence.

136.

137.
138.

139.

140.

141.
142.

(Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/23/climate/climate-summitglobal-warming.html [http://perma.cc/DV23-P8ZK].
Hai-Bin Zhang, Han-Cheng Dai, Hua-Xia Lai, & Wen-Tao Wang, U.S. Withdrawal
from the Paris agreement: Reasons, Impact and China’s Response, 8 ADVANCES CLIMATE
CHANGE RSCH. 220, 221 (2017).
Id.
Mariana Simões, Brazil’s Bolsonaro on the Environment, in His Own Words, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/world/americas
/bolsonaro-brazil-environment.html [https://perma.cc/ZV4N-6WNG].
Yanzhong Huang, Opinion, Why China’s Good Environmental Policies Have Gone
Wrong, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/14/opinion
/china-environmental-policies-wrong.html [https://perma.cc/ER4Q-F5VD].
See, e.g., Brittany Gibson, The Industrialized World is Failing to Meet Paris Agreement
Goals, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Oct. 1, 2019), https://prospect.org/world/climatecrisis-industrialized-world-failing-to-meet-paris-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/X7B98YLQ].
See supra Section II.A.
See Richardson, supra note 104.

460

michigan journal of gender

& law

[Vol. 27:435

ii. Follow-Through
The second similarity between these two global issues is a general
failure to execute, even when commitments are made on the international level. Domestic implementation of any plan to cut down on pol143
lution requires extensive public infrastructure to ensure success. The
commitment to reduce pollution is more than a high-level pact. It requires an in-the-weeds monitoring system of both small and large indus144
try players alike, a system that must be comprehensive and thorough.
Likewise, the prevention of wartime sexual violence extends beyond
sweeping resolutions that fail to create a world in which wartime sexual
violence ceases to exist. Barring a stark international cultural shift in
which every woman is recognized as having full human rights and allotted a position of respect in each society—a goal to work towards, certainly, but that would be naïve to expect in the near future—the commitment takes cooperation and work. There is an ongoing obligation to
145
address the problem before it arises, to deploy defensive mechanisms
146
during the conflict itself, and to aid survivors afterward through the
provision of sexual reproductive services and mental and physical thera147
py. The prevention of wartime sexual violence and voluntary pollution prevention programs have meaningful, core similarities. By studying these programs, the international community may be better able to
implement initiatives that will succeed in the prevention of wartime
sexual violence.
iii. International Buy-In
A final similarity between the two issues pertains to how the global
community can reach a permanent solution. Solving both issues requires
a reliance on cooperation at an international level. Voluntary environmental approaches oftentimes include collaboration between individual
businesses, industry associations, and regulatory agencies or central gov-

143. See Alex L. Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law and Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 365 (2013).
144. See Chittock & Hughey, supra note 131, at 548.
145. See infra Section III.B.
146. See infra Section III.B.
147. Countries frequently fall short on the implementation of these practices. See U.N.
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,
¶¶ 19-22, U.N. Doc S/2018/250 (Mar. 23, 2018).
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148

ernments. This cooperation among a panoply of national actors parallels the range of players that the U.N. must bring together in a country
149
to combat sexual violence as a weapon of war.
B. The Application of the Voluntary Pollution Prevention Framework to
Addressing Wartime Sexual Violence
Environmental law has identified several key features of successful
voluntary pollution prevention programs that may be applicable to the
prevention of sexual violence as a weapon of war. In 2010, environmental law Professors Donald Chittock and Kenneth Hughey conducted a
study surveying voluntary approaches to industry-wide pollution prevention programs in Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom,
150
and the United States. The Chittock research identified key features
of successful programs, at least three of which are applicable to the prevention of sexual violence as a weapon of war: Adequate and consistent
funding, regular and credible monitoring, and the threat of enforcement. As the study notes, and as an apt precaution when weighing strategies to prevent wartime sexual violence, no single mechanism is likely
151
to work in all circumstances. These three approaches are intended to
serve as preferred alternatives to Security Council Resolutions. Unlike
Security Council Resolutions that risk backsliding international progress, the three recommended mechanisms have the benefit of being
more practically effective while pushing forward the conversation surrounding women’s rights.
The following proposal will elaborate on how each of the three factors identified in Chittock’s study can prove useful in the context of addressing wartime sexual violence. The piecemeal nature of this solution
might be unattractive to some. This tripartite solution, however, has the
benefit of being realistic. Neither a unilateral change to the approach
nor the creation of a new multilateral framework would be an effective
answer to how the international community combats conflict-related
sexual violence. Although this proposal may be dissimilar to current approaches, it has the advantage of building upon pre-existing structures
whenever possible and incorporating mechanisms readily accepted by
148. Chittock, supra note 131, at 542.
149. See U.N. ACTION AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT, STOP RAPE NOW,
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/wps/StopRapeNow_Brochure.pdf
[http://perma.cc/F592-23JE].
150. See Chittock, supra note 131, at 542.
151. Id. at 543.
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the international community. In sum, a series of small, realistic fixes to
the current system is preferable over a theoretically elegant yet practicably unworkable solution.
i. Adequate and Consistent Funding
The first element of the new framework is adequate and consistent
funding for programs that combat conflict-related sexual violence. In
the pollution prevention context, the most successful pollution prevention programs in the Chittock study had the benefit of consistent fund152
ing. Other scholars have highlighted this as the “single, most im153
portant element” in ensuring the success of the programs. The
Chittock research found that reliable financing helped anti-pollution efforts in two ways. First, the researchers found that adequate and consistent funding worked to solidify pollution prevention’s place as one of
the “mainstream goals” in national environmental management pro154
grams. Second, the funding worked as a positive incentive to bring
155
key industry players into the fold of the voluntary programs. The consistent stream of capital helped to persuade the actors in question that
156
longevity of the program was assured.
One key criticism of the Chittock research should be addressed up
front. Commentators have noted that the five countries within the Chit157
tock study were each wealthy, developed nations. One may therefore
question whether the study’s outcomes would be the same in less affluent countries. To this point, even if initiatives such as adequate and consistent funding would not have produced a significant positive effect on
the lifespan of developing countries’ pollution prevention programs, this
does not diminish the study’s use as a template for the prevention of
conflict-related sexual violence. It would be naïve to assume there is a

152. Id. at 542.
153. Michael Peters & R. Kerry Turner, SME Environmental Attitudes and Participation in
Local-Scale Voluntary Initiatives: Some Practical Applications, 47 J. ENV’T PLAN. &
MGMT. 449, 457 (2004) (noting that a second key part of this “element” was the
“co-ordination of certain key players who would enable appropriate contacts to be
made and would be able to attract the necessary funding”).
154. Chittock, supra note 131, at 545.
155. Chittock and Hughey note that a “collaborative relationship with industry” players is
one of the key features of a successful voluntary pollution prevention program. See id.
at 542.
156. Id. at 547, 550.
157. The countries were Australia, Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United
States. Id. at 542.
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“one size fits all” method that would work for each country, region, or
city in which violence is occurring. But to write off adequate and consistent funding as a failure because certain research has yet to be conducted would be a mistake.
Based on the findings of the Chittock study, this Note argues that
adequate and consistent funding should also be applied in efforts to prevent sexual violence as a weapon of war. States such as France and Ger158
many have the political will and resources to spend on this cause. As
such, they need not waste diplomatic efforts on the negotiations of a
159
“watered-down” Security Council Resolution. Instead, these countries
can and should redirect their energies toward securing voluntary funds
for U.N. offices with the bandwidth to address this issue.
Voluntary funds are one way for states to exert soft power or informal governance over international organizations (IOs) and their sub160
sidiaries. IOs are institutional actors like the United Nations whose
161
membership is composed of at least three nation states. There are two
main ways that IOs are funded by their members. The first type of IO
funding scheme is a restricted voluntary system of funding. In this instance, state donors contribute funds earmarked for specific uses to the
162
IO. This allows members of an IO not only to determine the size of
their monetary contribution to the organization, but also to earmark
163
how their donations are used. In other words, it creates a system of
governance in which nations assign their funds to projects of their
164
choosing. To illustrate the popularity of this mechanism, approximately 80% of the World Health Organization’s (“WHO”) voluntary
funds are restricted for specific uses by their donors, as are 100% of the
158. See Resolution 2467: The Text is Not the End of Our Journey, supra note 108 (detailing
France’s disappointment in the U.S. position and reaffirming their commitment to
sexual health services); Amy Gunia, U.S. Pressures U.N. into Removing Language from
a Resolution on Sexual Violence, TIME (Apr. 24, 2019, 5:34 AM), https://time.com
/5577089/un-resolution-sexual-violence-weakened-language/
[http://perma.cc
/FHR9-NQYC]; see also Florence Schulz, U.N. Adopts Watered-Down Resolution
Against Rape as Weapon of War, EURACTIV (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/news/un-adopts-watereddown-resolution-against-rape-as-weapon-of-war/ [http://perma.cc/N54R-MGU6].
159. See Schulz, supra note 158.
160. See Erin R. Graham, Money and Multilateralism: How Funding Rules Constitute IO
Governance, 7 INT’L THEORY 162, 163 (2015).
161. See
Karen
Mingst,
International
Organization,
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-organization
[http://perma.cc
/2FZB-ZFKF].
162. See Graham, supra note 160, at 173-74.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 174.
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voluntary contributions donated to the United Nations Economic So165
cial Council (“UNESCO”). Thus, donors have the power to shape the
agendas of IOs through their contributions.
Restricted voluntary funding schemes stand in contrast to unrestricted voluntary funding methods. In the latter scenario, donors do
not earmark their monetary donations, providing the IO with more
166
freedom to implement its various goals. In the context of preventing
and addressing wartime sexual violence, the use of a restricted voluntary
funding scheme for donations to IOs is preferable to one that uses unrestricted voluntary funding, to ensure that this issue is the priority of
IOs.
The restricted voluntary funding scheme also has two distinct advantages over the use of Security Council Resolutions. First, countries
that wish to bypass the aforementioned political holdups of Security
Council Resolutions may instead publicly earmark their donor funds to
U.N. offices. This can signal the attention of the country in question to
conflict-related sexual violence and encourage other Member States to
do the same in turn.
One existing office to which nations may direct their funds is the
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual
167
Violence in Conflict (“SRSG-SVC”). The role of the SRSG-SVC is to
provide coherent and strategic leadership; to work effectively with existing U.N. coordination mechanisms; and to engage in advocacy efforts
168
with governments, parties to armed conflict, and civil society. Another potential target of Member States’ voluntary funding contribution is
Women’s Protection Advisers (“WPAs”), which takes on the role of advising during peacekeeping and special political missions in the midst of
169
conflict-related sexual violence. By directing restricted voluntary funds
to these offices, U.N. Member States could send a stronger message
than any non-binding Security Council Resolution brought forth by divided members and lacking an implementation plan ever could. Instead
of issuing resolutions “calling upon” other countries to help the cause,
states can and should lead by example. This message would become
even more powerful should states band together in donative coalitions
for this common cause.

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See id. at 173.
Id. at 173.
See generally S.C. Res. 2331, supra note 15.
See id.
See id.
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Second, adequate and consistent funding from the U.N. into offices such as the SRSG-SVC will help states fulfill the due diligence aspect
of their positive obligations. These include educating employees of the
judicial system and ensuring credible, thorough criminal investigations
170
when crimes do occur. This will work to deter and ultimately prevent
171
future violations.
Critics have argued that restricted voluntary funding is problematic
because it distorts IO program priorities and moves IO programming
172
decisions outside the organization itself to individual donors. In the
WHO example, critics contend that restricted voluntary funds are more
often “aimed at diseases that capture the public’s attention, like HIV
/AIDS,” rather than aligned with the true distribution of diseases
173
worldwide. But without voluntary funding to organizations such as
the SRSG-SVC, there is a risk that victims and survivors in conflictridden areas risk may be deprived of sorely needed aid. Even if one accepts the premise of the argument in the context of the WHO, the circumstances surrounding wartime sexual violence are very different. Restricted voluntary funding must be considered against the backdrop of
Security Council Resolutions which have done little to quell wartime
sexual violence; in this context, arguments about the model manage174
ment of IO funds verge on idealism.
A final point in support of restricted voluntary funding over Security Council Resolutions comes from behaviors that may accompany
U.N. Member States’ donations. Donations to IOs such as the SRSGSVC from powerful actors coupled with naming and shaming to prod
other donors to do the same has the potential to create a ripple effect of
positive outcomes. In keeping with the analogy of pollution prevention,
175
consider what has been coined as the “Greta Thunberg Effect.”
176
Thunberg is a seventeen-year-old Swedish environmental activist. Her

170. See MARIA ERIKSSON, DEFINING RAPE: EMERGING OBLIGATIONS FOR STATES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 201-02 (2011).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 160, at 175, 186.
173. Id. at 189.
174. See generally Graham, supra note 160.
175. Bonnie Chiu, The Greta Thunberg Effect: The Rise of Girl Eco-Warriors, FORBES (Sept.
19, 2019, 2:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniechiu/2019/09/19/thegreta-thunberg-effect-the-rise-of-girl-eco-warriors/#7bbcf627407f [https://perma.cc
/E6U8-4RK4].
176. As of December 2020, Thunberg is seventeen. Aylin Woodward, Greta Thunberg
Turns 17 Today. Here’s How She Started a Global Climate Movement in Just 18
Months, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 3, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com
/greta-thunberg-bio-climate-change-activist-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/M9A3-3BQ3].
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2019 speech at the U.N.’s Climate Action Summit castigating members
for their inaction on climate change was the pinnacle of her widely
broadcasted efforts to name and shame world leaders on environmental
177
failures. Thunberg’s campaign has had tangible effects. Teenagers
across the world are committing themselves to climate activism at a
178
higher rate and earlier age than previously recorded. Some consider
Thunberg to be responsible for the incoming European Commission
179
making the climate emergency its topmost priority. And perhaps most
striking, there has been a fourfold increase in investments in carbonreducing projects in developing countries since Thunberg rose to popu180
larity. Voluntary funding can force these changes as it is a multifaceted method. Motivated U.N. Member States that use voluntary funding
in conjunction with call-outs for other states to follow their example
could prove extraordinarily effective in ending conflict-related sexual violence.
ii. Regular, Credible Monitoring and Threat of Enforcement
The final two factors that will aid in addressing wartime sexual violence are best analyzed together as they are often interrelated. They are,
first, regular and credible monitoring, and second, the threat of en-

177. Charlotte Alter, Suyin Haynes & Justin Worland, Time 2019 Person of the Year: Greta Thunberg, TIME (Dec. 11, 2019), https://time.com/person-of-the-year-2019-gretathunberg/ [https://perma.cc/JEK3-8L6X]; Transcript: Greta Thunberg’s Speech at the
U.N. Climate Action Summit, NPR (Sept. 23, 2019, 1:58 PM), https://www.npr.org
/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-u-n-climateaction-summit [https://perma.cc/EX98-QDAN].
178. Chiu, supra note 175.
179. Ian Wishart & Ewa Krukowska, Europe’s $13 Trillion Climate Plan Might Be About to
Get Serious, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2019, 11:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2019-10-01/europe-s-13-trillion-climate-plan-might-be-about-to-getserious [https://perma.cc/GD9S-3BEM]. Note that there is a rich debate surrounding
which individuals get international media recognition for their activism. BIPOC individuals’ efforts are frequently excluded from the dominant narrative and a movement has emerged (spearheaded by young activists such as Vanessa Nakate) to recognize and support diversity in environmental activism. See Kenya Evelyn, ‘Like I
Wasn’t There’: Climate Activist Vanessa Nakate on Being Erased from a Movement,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2020, 3:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan
/29/vanessa-nakate-interview-climate-activism-cropped-photo-davos
[https://perma.cc/GD9S-3BEM].
180. Sandra Laville, ‘Greta Thunberg Effect’: Driving Growth in Carbon Offsetting,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2019, 5:02 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment
/2019/nov/08/greta-thunberg-effect-driving-growth-in-carbon-offsetting
[https://perma.cc/G3BF-KQ55].
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forcement. In the Chittock study, the most effective pollution preven181
tion programs were those with successful monitoring practices. These
included enhanced public and private monitoring networks, senior
management commitment, and transparency through public report182
ing. The most successful prevention programs also made use of strong
183
enforcement measures.
U.N. members should make use of monitoring systems already in
184
place and leverage them for this cause. Consider the example of female genital mutilation (FGM) of young girls, a practice in thirty coun185
tries around the world. The United Nations Population Fund
(“UNFPA”) along with the United Nations Children’s Fund
(“UNICEF”) have had great success in accelerating the elimination of
the practice, providing more than 3.2 million women in seventeen
186
countries with FGM protection and services. They achieved this progress primarily through the provision of care and protection services, local political backing, and community-led engagement efforts that act as
monitoring systems to deter and prevent FGM in their respective coun187
tries.
The provision of care and protection services is also important
within the context of wartime sexual violence. Ensuring that victims of
wartime sexual violence have access to abortion and other sexual health
188
services is a requirement under international law. It is also a painfully
practical necessity, as survivors forced to carry a child conceived during
wartime sexual violence may be ostracized by their community, subjected to spousal abandonment and violence, and even killed for the per189
ceived dishonoring of their family. All these effects are felt on top of
190
the mental and physical agony of the violence itself. The provision of
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

186.

187.
188.
189.
190.

Chittock & Hughey, supra note 131, at 545-46.
Id. at 545.
Id.
See discussion supra Section III.B (detailing the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence
in Conflict initiative).
Although FGM is practiced in thirty countries around the world, note that four
countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Sudan) account for approximately 42% of
all cases. 6 Facts About Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), WORLD VISION (2019),
https://www.worldvision.org/child-protection-news-stories/female-genitalmutilation-fgm-facts [https://perma.cc/6NKS-UDDQ].
UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme to Eliminate Female Genital Mutilation,
UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, https://www.unfpa.org/unfpa-unicef-jointprogramme-eliminate-female-genital-mutilation [https://perma.cc/VP4K-SCB4].
Id.
GLOB. JUST. CTR., supra note 32, at 1-2.
Id. at 5.
Id.
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sexual health services and abortion for survivors of wartime sexual violence may allow women to escape the piling on of more lasting psycho191
logical, economic, and physical burdens.
To be truly effective, any strategy to combat sexual violence as a
192
weapon of war must begin before conflict arises. For example, studies
have shown that a link exists between regions that have high levels of
domestic violence during peacetime and the incidents of sexual violence
193
that take place during armed conflict. Within the pollution context,
prevention programs were more successful when there were high levels
194
of commitment by local government; similarly, to prevent sexual violence during wartime, there must be high levels of commitment by local
authorities during times of peace to credibly crack down on instances of
195
violence against women. Ensuring the development of successful
monitoring systems during times of peace addresses the causes of the issue instead of merely quashing the symptoms. Arguably, by the time a
U.N. resolution is deemed necessary to address sexual violence as a
weapon of war, it is already too late. Monitoring may therefore prove far
more effective at combatting the use of this violence.
In addition to preventative measures such as those described above,
the threat of credible enforcement to intervene in and punish wartime
sexual violence must also exist. This should come through additional
funding and training for U.N. peacekeepers. U.N. peacekeeping missions can be remarkably effective. As of July 2020, there are over
100,000 active peacekeepers taking part in thirteen missions around the
196
world. It is a truly global effort, in that more than 120 countries con197
tribute personnel to the peacekeeping forces. The forces contribute to
a variety of efforts, from supporting local regional police on the ground
in efforts to end violence; to deterring extrajudicial violence and kidnappings in areas of conflict; to strengthening security, the rule of law,

191. Id.
192. See Kirthi Jayakumar, Sexual Violence as a Peacetime-Wartime Continuum, PEACE
INSIGHT (Apr. 17, 2013), https://www.peaceinsight.org/blog/2013/04/sexualviolence-as-a-peacetime-wartime-continuum/ [https://perma.cc/64NU-V276].
193. Daniela Nadj, Sexual Violence Is a Widespread Weapon of War—It’s Time International Law Caught Up, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 10, 2018, 4:42 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/sexual-violence-women-warfeminism-gender-isis-yazidi-boko-haram-nobel-peace-prize-a8595736.html
[https://perma.cc/HSQ2-6SZC].
194. Chittock & Hughey, supra note 131, at 546.
195. Nadj, supra note 193.
196. U.N. Peacekeeping, BETTER WORLD CAMPAIGN, https://betterworldcampaign.org/unpeacekeeping/ [https://perma.cc/BK44-D2D2].
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198

and human rights. Peacekeeping is also cost-efficient. The U.N.
peacekeeping budget is less than half of 1% of the amount spent on militaries globally, yet more than eight times as effective as compared to
199
when the United States acts in similar missions by itself.
Still, two main problems persist with U.N. peacekeeping missions:
inadequate funding and a harmful culture. Each is difficult to separate
from the other. Because U.N. peacekeeping missions are far from perfect as they currently exist, solutions are needed before they can play an
effective role in enforcement actions. A mere six years ago, a U.N. declaration named sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers as, “the
200
most significant risk to U.N. peacekeeping missions.” Some scholars
suggest that despite operational directives to prevent this abuse—
curfews, non-fraternization policies, uniform requirements, and offlimit locations—success has been limited and sexual abuse by peace201
keepers has merely been “pushed underground.” Commentators opine
that training for peacekeeping operations currently functions as an administrative rubber stamp rather than a meaningful program that instills
202
peacekeepers with shared values, knowledge, and practical know-how.
The training program is bereft of opportunities to think critically, and
procedural compliance is considered to be of greater value than reckoning with problematic social structures that prop up cultures of sexual vi203
olence.
This is a staggering failure in the U.N. peacekeeping culture.
Worse, initiatives to correct failures in peacekeeping operations tend to
be reactive and largely concerned with the risk to the U.N.’s image, instead of addressing the root of the issue. As Professors Jasmine-Kim
Westendorf and Louise Searle note:

198. U.N. Peacekeeping: A Year in Review, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING,
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Despite powerful statements about the ‘cancer’ of [sexual
abuse and exploitation during peacekeeping operations] and
the U.N.’s commitment to addressing it, the advancement of
[sexual abuse and exploitation] policy has been largely reactive, occurring in surges prompted by public outcry at incidents reported in international media . . . Paradoxical though
it may seem, [the U.N.] seems concerned with both protecting its image and developing robust [sexual abuse and exploitation] framework; but the former creates incentives to
downplay difficulties in the latter . . . thereby impairing the
chances of arriving at robust assessments of [sexual abuse and
exploitation] allegations and policy which might lead to im204
proved approaches.
This analysis reveals several areas that must be improved for peacekeeping forces to reach their full potential in eliminating wartime sexual violence and to prevent peacekeeping forces from committing the same
crimes that they are deployed to prevent.
First, nations must retreat from lofty pronouncements on global
statements of principle, such as U.N. resolutions, and use voluntary
funding sources to promote transparency and true change within peacekeeping operations through proactive rather than reactive measures.
Second, as in the pollution context, commitment by “senior manage205
ment” and public reporting is key. Funds must be devoted to the creation of a system whereby superiors in charge of peacekeeping operations
are incentivized to report instances of sexual exploitation by personnel
within their ranks with the knowledge that material punishments of
204. Id. at 382. Westendorf and Searle continue:
One key weakness is that policy has been developed at the international
level in response to major media events with little input from the field
about challenges already faced in implementing SEA policies . . . This individualized understanding of SEA masks the diverse range of factors that
create circumstances in which individuals choose to exploit or abuse, and
obscures the practical challenges that middle- to high-ranking officials
pose when they refuse to deal with allegations or are simply too occupied
with ‘hard security’ issues to take ‘gender issues’ seriously. Further, a
compliance-based approach assumes that robust accountability mechanisms will deter breaches of rules—a logic for which there is little evidence in relation to CRSV, and which is further undermined by the low
rates of criminal charges or material punishments for perpetrators of
SEA.
Id.
205. Chittock & Hughey, supra note 131, at 545.
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206

perpetrators will be issued and enforced. This will almost certainly require individualized training to recognize and punish any sexual vio207
lence that occurs. At present, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping
208
Operations is woefully underfunded for this task.
There is no lack of ideas to solve sexual abuse and exploitation by
peacekeepers; rather, the problem lies in the capacity, expertise, and
209
money to implement those ideas. States with an interest in funding
effective programs to prevent sexual violence during times of conflict
210
should view peacekeeping as an integral part of the solution. Solving
the liquidity crisis that the U.N. peacekeeping forces currently face and
earmarking funds for robust training practices for the troops will work
to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation by peacekeepers. Further, this
will serve to reinforce the threat of credible enforcement against wouldbe perpetrators of sexual violence during times of conflict.
Conclusion
U.N. resolutions are frequently used as well-intentioned efforts to
draw international attention to the use of sexual violence as a weapon of
war. However, they are not only ineffective, but can be damaging to the
status of and discourse surrounding women’s rights. Each resolution is a
gamble: Recent history has shown that disagreements during negotiations and the threat of a veto by a Permanent Five member are likely to
derail any meaningful form of progress.
More useful and effective U.N. mechanisms exist and should be
used in place of Security Council Resolutions. Solutions may be found
by looking to the successes of voluntary pollution prevention programs:

206. Westendorf & Searle, supra note 201, at 383.
207. Id.
208. Id. Westendorf & Searle elaborate:
The problem facing the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the
volume of personnel required to undertake mandatory training: latest statistics show 117,306 military and civilian personnel from at least 125
countries serving in 16 [peace keeping operations]. The vast number of
personnel poses the risk that training becomes more an administrative requirement than a tool for effective prevention.
Id.
209. Id.
210. Peacekeeping has the potential to be an effective force in reducing sexual violence. See
Karin Johansson & Lisa Hultman, U.N. Peacekeeping and Protection from Sexual Violence, 63 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1656, 1678 (2019).
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Consistent funding by way of voluntary restricted funding; regular,
credible monitoring; and the credible threat of enforcement by U.N.
peacekeeping operations may turn the tide on the prevention of sexual
violence during wartime. U.N. members should not eschew collaboration on these commitments, but should also exercise independence in
pushing toward these goals. This should be the case even if the countries
in question are not fully supported by the most powerful states within
the U.N.
Although discourse surrounding the prevention of wartime sexual
violence has arguably moved past its history of being sidelined as a
“feminist research agenda,” there is still a lack of accountability and ri211
gor surrounding estimates of sexual violence during conflict. This
means that a large amount of wartime sexual violence still remains un212
reported, notwithstanding the extraordinarily grim numbers of which
213
we are aware. When unanimous agreement is unreachable yet urgently
needed, as in Security Council Resolutions, states must make use of institutional mechanisms that currently exist within the U.N. that do not
require compromise or concessions. This may come through the provision of voluntary funds to U.N. offices such as the SRSG-SVC and
WPA, coupled with naming and shaming of other states who refuse to
do the same; through support for U.N. funds that aim to eliminate violence against women during times of peace; and through voluntary
funding for the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Sexual
violence during times of conflict is sure to emerge time and again in
new and ongoing conflicts if new strategies are not explored. It is incumbent upon Member States to assume responsibility for these preventable tragedies. The realistic methods outlined within this Note
should be the first steps toward a workable and collaborative effort to
end wartime sexual violence.
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